Cincinnati Bengals

The Cincinnati Bengals finished 2025 at six and eleven, missing the playoffs for the third consecutive year in their worst season since 2020. This was a year defined by quarterback attrition, defensive collapse, and the cruel math of a team that could light up the scoreboard one week and go completely dark the next. Joe Burrow suffered a turf toe injury in the Week 2 win over Jacksonville and landed on injured reserve, leaving the Bengals without their franchise quarterback for the better part of the season — and Cincinnati went just one and eight without him. There were flashes: a Week 7 thriller over Pittsburgh, a Week 13 demolition of Baltimore on the road, and a two-game winning streak to close out December against Miami and Arizona. But those highs were swallowed by lows like the Week 3 blowout in Minnesota, a shutout loss to Baltimore in Week 15 that officially ended playoff hopes, and a Week 14 collapse in Buffalo where a ten-point fourth-quarter lead evaporated on two Burrow interceptions. Head coach Zac Taylor was retained despite the results, but the heat is unmistakably rising heading into year eight.

The Bengals averaged twenty-three points per game on offense but surrendered nearly twenty-eight, a scoring differential that screams losing football. The variance was staggering — Cincinnati scored forty-two and forty-five points in back-to-back home stretches yet also put up zero against Baltimore and just three in Denver, making this one of the most boom-or-bust offenses in the league. Total expected points added on offense landed at minus nine for the season, a slightly below-average mark dragged down by twenty-four turnovers. The defense was far worse: total expected points added allowed checked in at plus one hundred thirty-four, and remember, for a defense you want that number negative, so plus one thirty-four is borderline catastrophic. The Bengals forced only twenty-one takeaways against those twenty-four giveaways, finishing underwater on turnover margin, and allowed opponents to convert forty-four percent of their third downs. The offense had enough talent to win games but couldn't stop giving the ball away, and the defense simply could not get off the field.

Now let's talk about the passing offense. Cincinnati threw for nearly two hundred fifty yards per game, racked up thirty-six passing touchdowns, and featured arguably the best wide receiver in football — yet the passing unit's total expected points added was minus eighteen. How? Turnovers and instability at quarterback. Burrow played just eight games but was sensational when healthy, posting a passing expected points added of plus thirty-six point six and a completion percentage over expected of plus four point six percent. When he went down, the Bengals cycled through Jake Browning and Joe Flacco, and while Flacco provided competent spot duty, Browning's five starts produced a passing expected points added of minus thirty-eight point four, a number that essentially erased everything Burrow had built. The offensive line allowed thirty-six sacks, and the passing game was wildly inconsistent week to week — electric in the Week 9 shootout against Chicago, invisible in the Week 4 shutout at Denver. Ja'Marr Chase was the constant, hauling in one hundred twenty-five catches for one thousand four hundred twelve yards and eight touchdowns across sixteen games, posting a receiving expected points added of plus forty-one point four. Chase commanded a thirty-two percent target share and a thirty-seven percent share of total air yards, meaning roughly a third of everything Cincinnati threw went his direction. Even in a lost season, he was a top-tier force — but one receiver can't fix a quarterback carousel and twenty-four turnovers.

Now let's dig into the rushing offense. The ground game averaged ninety-four point six yards per game on three hundred seventy-two carries, producing a total rushing expected points added of plus nine point one three — one of the few positive efficiency marks on the entire roster, though volume-driven rather than explosive. That plus-zero-point-zero-two per-carry expected points added is modest but represents a unit that at least stayed above water. The run game was at its best in blowout wins — Chase Brown ripped off chunk gains in the Week 16 romp over Miami and the Week 17 win over Arizona — but largely disappeared in losses where Cincinnati fell behind early and had to abandon the run. Brown carried the load with two hundred thirty-two carries for one thousand nineteen yards and six rushing touchdowns, adding sixty-nine catches for four hundred thirty-seven yards and five scores as a receiver. Eleven rushing touchdowns as a team and a twenty-five percent red-zone touchdown rate on one hundred fifty-one snaps inside the twenty tell you the Bengals left points on the field when it mattered most.

Next up, the pass defense. This is where the season truly got muffed. Cincinnati's pass defense allowed a total expected points added of plus ninety-four — again, for a defense, you want that number negative, so plus ninety-four means opposing quarterbacks were adding nearly six expected points of value per game just through the air against this secondary. The Bengals gave up four thousand one hundred seventy-five passing yards and thirty-three passing touchdowns, with a per-play passing expected points added allowed of plus zero-point-one-six, meaning the average dropback against Cincinnati was a net positive for the opponent. The unit allowed seventy-nine explosive plays of twenty-plus yards, nearly five per game — a coverage breakdown rate that puts constant pressure on an offense to keep pace. There were individual bright spots — Dax Hill, Geno Stone, and D'Angelo Knight flashed in the takeaway department with timely interceptions across the year — but the unit finished thirty-first in the league in yards allowed and the underlying efficiency numbers were just as grim, with modest late-season improvement under new defensive coordinator Al Golden.

And the run defense. If the pass defense was bad, the run defense was right there with it. Cincinnati allowed two thousand five hundred seventeen rushing yards — one hundred forty-eight point one per game — with a total rushing expected points added allowed of plus forty point three two, meaning opposing ground games were consistently moving the chains and adding scoring value. The per-carry expected points added allowed of plus zero-point-zero-nine doesn't sound enormous, but over four hundred sixty-four opponent carries it compounds into a unit that simply could not set an edge or hold its gaps, week after week with no real improvement. Eighteen rushing touchdowns allowed underscores the damage. The run defense was at its worst during the mid-season losing streak, when teams like Detroit and Chicago gashed the interior at will, and even in wins the Bengals rarely dominated the line of scrimmage. The front seven was consistently pushed around, and no single player emerged as a reliable anchor against the run.